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1 Introduction 
There are many reasons why organisations need to start conducting vulnerability 
management. These reasons can be requirements from a standard, regulations for 
the specific business area or from another organisation with which the organisation 
has a partnership with. Often, when an organisation decides to implement 
vulnerability management, the organisation encounters problems with technical 
understanding of the vulnerabilities, vulnerability mitigation and other supporting 
processes. Therefore, this thesis is aimed at the organisations considering to begin or 
are having problems with vulnerability management. The goal for the thesis is to give 
organisations a better understanding about vulnerabilies, the maturity of an 
organisation’s cyber security and offer an easily adoptable vulnerability management 
model. The thesis is restricted to only technical vulnerabilities, which can be found 
with a vulnerability scanner. 
According to the Finnish National Cyber Security Center (2019, 6), vulnerabilities are 
exploited almost immdiately and Finnish organisations do not know their own 
infrastructure well enough; hence, they lack capabilities to notice and react to these 
cyber attacks. One key risk for organisations are servers on the public internet, which 
are actively polled and attempted to crack using exploits from vulnerabilities (ibid., 
25). NCSC-FI lists a lack of updating and password management to be developed in 
expectations for the year 2019 (ibid., 43). 
According to Lehto, Limnéll, Innola, Pöyhänen, Rusi and Salminen (2017, 16), 
vulnerability exploiting was one major trend in 2016 and criminals actively search 
and exploit vulnerabilites. Therefore, vulnerabilities need to be found and mitigated 
as early as possible. The cyber security in private sector organisations works 
efficiently considering the common malware protection, power supply functionality, 
and networks. There are national challenges in cyber security due to the lack of 
skilled cyber security specialists. Organisations implement cyber security mostly 
reactively; however with some exceptation there is also some proactivity. 
Organisations fall behind in following the national cyber security strategy when it 
comes to creating a big picture of the status of cyber security or reaching cyber 
security maturity levels. (Lehto et al. 2017, 45-46) 
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In the International Telecommunications Union’s (2017, 56) Global Cybersecurity 
Index 2017, the Finnish cyber security is ranked 16th on the global scale. Finland gets 
an extra mention about bilaterality for its activity in global organisations such as 
Council of Europe and the United Nations. In addition, also multilateral agreement 
strengthening nordic cooperation with National CERTs (ibid., 44) are mentioned. The 
Finnish cyber security received a low score in sectoral CERT and professional training 
courses (ibid., 37). 
Offering organisations a better understanding and model about vulnerability 
management should benefit the national cyber security level of organisations as they 
are able to adopt vulnerability management as another layer of security. 
Vulnerability scanners are able to find missing updates and configuration mistakes 
such as default passwords. 
The research is assigned by Telia Inmics-Nebula Oy. Telia Inmics-Nebula Oy is part of 
Telia Company. Telia Inmics-Nebula Oy was established as fusion of Inmics Oy and 
Nebula Oy in January 2019. On the January 2020 Telia Datainfo Oy was merged into 
Telia Inmics-Nebula Oy. Telia Inmics-Nebula Oy is an ICT service provider with about 
500 employees (Telia-Inmics Nebula 2020). 
2 Research 
2.1 Research background and objectives 
For small and medium size organisations it may not be easy to implement or upkeep 
a vulnerability management, and often organisations are not aware of their cyber 
security maturity either. As there is material available from organisations such as 
International Organisation Standardization, National Institute Standards and 
Technology, implementing the vulnerability management into one’s own 
organisation may be difficult due lack of understanding the cyber security context.  
The aim of this thesis is to increase the understanding of vulnerability management 
and to develop a common vulnerability management implementation process or 
suggest an existing implementation process which is not too heavy and complex for 
the organisations to implement. The thesis studies information and previous 
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researches about technical vulnerabilites, vulnerability management implementation 
processes, cyber security maturity models and vulnerability scanners. Utilizing the 
research results organisations should benefit by gaining an adoptable vulnerability 
management implementation process and; therefore, increase the capability of their 
cyber security.  
The research questions for this thesis are listed in below. 
How to build a solid basis to begin vulnerability management?  
 
When is the organisation mature enough for technical vulnerability management? 
 
Can there be an easily adaptable implementation process for technical vulnerability 
management? 
 
A brief search from Theseus (N.d.) using this research related search words revealed 
that there hasn’t been done a comparative research about vulnerability management 
implementation processes or cyber security frameworks or cyber security maturity 
models in this context. There are mentions of these subjects in theses, but targeted 
research was not found. Eventually a comparative research named Comparative 
Study of Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Models by Rea-Guaman, San Feliu, Calvo-
Manzano and Sanchez-Garcia made in 2007 was found (Rea-Guaman et al. 2017, 2). 
2.2 Research methods 
This thesis uses comparative research and qualitative research in a multi-method 
analysis format. The chosen research methods were chosen due to the nature of 
existing processes and models which need to be compared to find out their 
advantages and disadvantages to be able to build more easily adaptable models and 
processes. 
2.2.1 Comparative research 
Routio (2007) explains comparative research as an option to research what is 
different and similar about chosen cases which in this thesis will be processes or 
models. The method of comparison is one of the most effective ways to observe 
differences of the selected cases and explain the differences in an easily 
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compareable format such as a table. The comparative study has two major styles, 
namely descriptive comparison and normative comparison. Descriptive comparison 
describes and explains differences of cases and usually avoids creating changes. 
Normative comparison aims to observe the present state of cases and improve them 
in the future. This thesis aims to observe cases off vulnerability implementation 
processes and generate a new common implementation process or promote an 
existing one; thus, this research uses normative comparison as the research method. 
(Routio 2007.) 
According to Lor (2011, 2) a comparative research is often used in social sciences, but 
it can be used in all science.   
2.2.2 Qualitative research 
Jyväskylä University Koppa is an open data storage describing that qualitative 
research enhances knowledge about the research topic due to there being multiple 
areas connected to the center of this thesis. (Jyväskylä University 2015). 
Kananen describes qualitative research as any research which aims to achieve 
enhancement of the knowledge and gain better understanding of the subject 
without statistical or other quanitative means. The qualitative research analysis is 
utilized and a frame of reference throughout the research process to guide the 
research process and data collection. This thesis contains qualitatively selected 
literature to increase knowledge and understanding of cyber security frameworks, 
maturity models and vulnerability management. (Kananen 2014, 21-23.) 
2.3 Research plan 
The implementation of the research plan follows closely the literature reviews’ 
discussion of cyber security frameworks, maturity models, and vulnerability 
management. This provides a solid and supporting basis to understand about cyber 
security frameworks and maturity models as well as to build vulnerability 
management implementation processes. The goal is to find and compare two to four 
cyber security frameworks, two to four maturity models and two to four vulnerability 
management implementation processes. These found research subjects will be 
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compared regarding their levels of hiearchy required in the organisation and the 
number of steps in the process. Based on the comparison and qualitative analysis, 
new simplier models may be developed or existing recommended.  If new models 
and processes are developed, they shall be compared with existing models and 
processes. The process of is explained below (see Figure 1)Figure 1. The research 
process. 
 
 
 
Figure 1. The research process 
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3 Literature review 
This literature review provides an analytical basis for the study with the aim of 
creating a framework in order for the reader to understand when an organisation 
should start vulnerability management through contrasting and comparing various 
cyber security frameworks, maturity models and vulnerability management 
processes. The review starts with the basic information about cyber security 
frameworks and finishes with various maturity models and vulnerability 
management. In understanding the major cyber security maturity models and 
vulnerability management tools, this thesis is able to measure and compare the 
dataset for this thesis accordingly. 
For the literature review search engines such as Google, Google Scholar, FINNA, 
JANET and Melinda were used to gather possible sources to find literature to support 
the thesis. The used search phrases were cyber security, cyber security framework, 
security framework, vulnerablity management, vulnerability management model, 
vulnerability management process, vulnerability assessment, cyber security maturity 
model and maturity model. The search phrases returned vast amount of results 
which helped to find usable research subjects for comparison. Eventually, the 
literature data was decided to be obtained mostly from the original sources. 
3.1 Cyber Security Frameworks 
National Institution of Standards and Technology define the cyber security 
framework with words “The Framework is voluntary guidance, based on existing 
standards, guidelines, and practices for organizations to better manage and reduce 
cybersecurity risk.” (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2018a). 
The frameworks selected for this literature review had requirement that these 
models are known, widely used, adaptable to cyber security and contain comparable 
features. The selected frameworks are National Institute of Standards and 
Technology Cybersecurity Framework, Institutional Organisation for Standardization 
ISO27001 standard and Center for Internet Security Controls.  
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3.1.1 National Institute of Standards and Technology Cybersecurity 
Framework 
The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) was given a role to 
develop cyber security risk framework for critical infrastructure by the Cybersecurity 
Enhancement Act of 2014 in The United States of America. The purpose of the 
Cybersecurity Enhancement Act of 2014 ordered National Institute of Standards and 
Technology to identify a framework for organisations in the critical infrastructure. 
(National Institute of Standards and Technology 2018b, 1.) 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework is technology neutral and refer to other 
standards, guidelines and best practices. With the taxonomy and mechanisms 
provided by the framework, organisations can detail their current state of cyber 
security, a target state of cyber security, use continuous and repeatable processes to 
identify and prioritize improvement opportunities, gauge progress to the target state 
and cyber security risk communication for stakeholders. Organisations can use the 
framework as a compliance for their own requirements for cyber security. 
Organisations have different sizes, risks, threats, vulnerabilities and risk tolerances; 
however, the framework is not designed with “one-size-fits-all” approach, and it is 
intended to be used organisation of any size or focus to reduce and improve 
management of cyber security risks. Risk management is defined as a continuous 
process of identifying, evaluating, and responding to risks. Organisations, through 
the implementation of risk management services and programs, are offered the 
capability to assess and convey adjustments to the cyber security program they have. 
Additionally, the cyber security framework offers organisations the ability to 
assertively select and administer improvement in cybersecurity risk management for 
the ICS and IT environments. This framework is alterable to provide an adjustable 
and risk-based execution that can be used with a wide range of cybersecurity risk 
management processes. The risk management can cover the whole organisation or 
specific parts or processes. A risk-based approach is used to cyber security risk 
management, which contains three parts as the Framework Core, the Framework 
Implementation Tiers and the Framework Profiles. These three parts will be 
explained later in this chapter. (National Institute of Standards and Technology 
2018b, 1-4.) 
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The Framework Core defines the required activities to achieve a desired state of a 
cyber security control. The Framework Core extends key cyber security outcomes 
recognized by stakeholders as beneficial in managing cyber security risk. The 
Framework Core provides a hierarchical approach with four elements which are 
Function, Category, Subcategory and Informative Reference.  The Framework Core 
structure is illustrated in the image below (see Figure 2). Functions are the top-level 
activities and they are Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover. Each function 
is divided into categories which are further divided into subcategories and 
informative references. The Identify function concentrates on building up the 
foundation for managing cyber security risks by understanding the important 
business functions with their related and required resources. The Protect function 
reduces the likelihood and the effect against cyber security event. The Detect 
function helps to discover the occurrences of cyber security events. The Respond 
function helps with planning and reacting against security incidents. The Recover 
function reduces the time of recovery to the normal operations during an occurrence 
of a security incident. (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2018b, 5-8.) 
 
 
 
Figure 2. The structure of the Framework Core (National Institute of Standards and 
Technology 2018b, 6)  
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The tiers in the Framework Implementation Tiers measure the capability of an 
organisation how it assesses and mitigates cyber security risks. The tiering system 
has four levels, from lower to higher the tiers are Partial, Risk-Informed, Repeatable 
and Adaptable. At the Partial tier, the risk management is carried out ad hoc, and the 
awareness of risk management is very low.  At the Risk-Informed tier, the risk 
management takes place at the higher level; however, no organisation-wide risk 
policy exists. At the Repeatable tier, the organisation has created a formal 
organisation-wide risk management process, and the security policy supports the risk 
management process. In the Adaptable part of the tiers, organisations will adjust 
their cyber security policies based upon found and learned discoveries. It is analytics 
driven and offers insights and preferable practices. Organisations consistently learn 
from the security events that take place within the organisation and in turn, share 
this information with a larger network. (Cipher N.d.) 
A Framework Profile is a combination of Functions, Categories and Subcategories, 
aligned with the organisation’s business requirements, risk tolerance and resources. 
With a Profile an organisation can build a roadmap to reduce a risk as Profiles can 
indicate the current and target states of cyber security. With Profiles for current and 
target stages an organisation can use those Profiles to create a gap analysis. A risk-
based approach by prioritizing gap mitigation helps the organisation to move 
towards the next tier. (National Institute of Standards and Technology 2018b, 11.) 
3.1.2 ISO27001 Standard 
The ISO 27000 standard series is about information security management systems 
standards which provide universal model to implement and operate a management 
system. With the information security management system, it is possible to create a 
framework to manage and protect organisations information assets. When an 
organisation is developing information security management system, the most 
necessary standard is ISO 27001. The ISO 27001 standard gives organisation the 
necessary requirements to fill for information security management system. The 
standard introduces organisations cyclic model Plan-Do-Check-Act which is very 
important to make the management a continuous process. (ISO27000.org) 
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The essential parts for framework in the ISO 27001 standard are chapters 4 to 10. In 
these chapters define the context of the organisation, leadership, planning, support, 
operation, performance evaluation and improvement within the information security 
management system (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 27001:2017, 2). 
To build information security management system an organisation defines the 
context of the organisation. This means that the organisation needs to define what 
and why they want establish information management system. Who are relevant 
parties for the information management system and what requirements they cause? 
An organisation needs to define a clear scope for the information management 
system. (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 27001:2017, 4-5) 
For information security management system to be effective, a good leadership is 
needed; therefore, organisation’s top management involvement and commitment is 
required. Information security policy or policies are required and need to be 
enforced. The essential organisational roles, responsibilities and authorities for 
information security need to be assigned and communicated. (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 
27001:2017, 5-6) 
The information security management system related planning requires establishing 
a risk management for information security risks. The objectives for information 
security need to have a plan to achieve them. (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 27001:2017, 8-10) 
Support that the information security management system requires are resources, 
competences, awareness, communication and documentation (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 
27001:2017, 11-12). 
To operate the information security management system, several processes are 
required, and the organisation must implement and control them. The risk 
assessment for information security must be carried out frequently or when changes 
happen. Information security risk treatment plan must be implemented. (SFS-EN 
ISO/IEC 27001:2017, 12) 
The information security management system requires continuous or periodical 
evaluation of its performance by monitoring, measuring, analysing, evaluating the 
information security management system. Improvement of the information security 
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and information management system can be achieved from performance 
evaluations. (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 27001:2017, 12-14) 
3.1.3 CIS Controls 
The Central for Internet Security, Inc, in short CIS, is a non-profit organisation which 
has collected a CIS Controls to provide a comprehensive cyber defence capability to 
protect systems and networks. Like the other frameworks it is not a one-size-fits-all 
solution and organisations must understand their criticalities. The CIS Controls are a 
set of best practices which have been developed by experienced IT professionals in 
the field of cyber defence. Due for being developed by IT professionals with first-
hand experiences the CIS Controls have been able to develop into a very effective 
solution to combat against common or advanced attacks. The CIS Controls reflects to 
the five critical guidelines of an effective cyber defence which are offense informs 
defence, prioritization, measurements and metrics, continuous diagnostics and 
mitigation, and automation. The CIS Controls are meant to help organisations to 
prioritize their focus on the most important actions for selecting the cyber security 
controls to protect themselves. (The Center for Internet Security 2019, 1-3) 
To scale the framework at different sized organisations the CIS Controls has 
introduced Implementation Groups, in short IGs). There are three Implementation 
Groups which organisations may use based on their cyber security capabilities. The 
usual division the Implementation Groups works that micro-enterprises self-classify 
themselves to IG1, small and medium enterprises IG2 and large enterprises IG3. 
Other criteria which organisations may use to identify their Implementation Group 
are the sensitivity of data and criticality of service, cyber security skill level and 
available resources for cyber security. The Implementation Groups are cumulative as 
for example IG2 contains all sub-controls defined in the IG1. The recommended path 
to implement the CIS Controls start from the lower Implementation Group Sub-
Controls to the higher. (The Center for Internet Security 2019, 4-5) 
The CIS Controls are divided to three major categories which are Basic, Foundational 
and Organisational. There are six Controls in Basic, ten Controls in Foundational and 
four Controls in Organisational categories. The Controls in Basic category help to 
secure the environment with identifying assets and vulnerabilities, basic device 
15 
 
 
hardening and logging. In the Foundational category the Controls are more 
technology oriented.  Organisational category Controls strengthen and tests the 
organisation capabilities against cyber threats. (See Figure 3, which shows the 
Controls in the framework.) (The Center for Internet Security 2019, 1-70) 
 
 
 
Figure 3. CIS Controls (The Center for Internet Security 2019) 
 
 
3.2 Cyber Security Maturity Models 
A maturity model is a collection of attributes, characteristics, patterns or indicators 
that contain the progression of capability in a discipline. The overall content of the 
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model typically provides the best practices and may include standards or other codes 
of practices. In other words, a maturity model provides a benchmark against which 
an organisation can evaluate their current level of processes, methods, and capability 
of its practices. Furthermore, this allows the organisation to set goals and priorities 
for potential improvement. This also allows for the organisation to compare how its 
competitors or peers are performing overall by examining the capability of such 
competitors. (US Department of Energy 2014, 3.) 
In order to measure progression within a cyber security maturity models, these 
models typically have what are referred to as levels along a scale. The Cybersecurity 
Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) for example, uses a scale of maturity indicator 
levels (MIL) of 0-3, which will be discussed in more detail in a later section. Along 
with each level there is a set of attributes that describe and define the level. If these 
attributes are present in the organisation, it has achieved the described level. The 
effectiveness of having such a level scale enables the organisation to determine its 
current and future state which is guaranteeably more mature and identify what it 
must do to achieve that future state. (ibid.) 
The maturity models selected for this literature review had requirement that these 
models are known, adaptable to cyber security and contain comparable features. The 
selected maturity models are Capability Maturity Model, Cybersecurity Capability 
Maturity Model and ITScore. Other maturity models for cyber security exist and 
there are previous researches for example by Le&Hoang (2016) who researched 
maturity models supporting cyber security. 
3.2.1 Capability Maturity Model (CMM) 
The capability maturity model, in short CMM, is an early maturity model developed 
to improve quality of software development; however, it is widely applied in multiple 
fields and has been evolved into other cyber security maturity models. The strengths 
of this maturity model for cyber security lie in comprehensive management 
processes and it has wide coverage to be extended for security domains. (Le&Hoang 
2016, 2.) 
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The capability maturity model has been shown to increase the effectiveness and 
efficiency of security programs. This is obtained through focusing on a thorough and 
repeatable security process, in which self-improvement becomes more automated 
and integrated into the operational infrastructure. (Acohido 2015.) 
In the capability maturity model, there are five maturity levels, namely initial, 
repeatable, defined, managed and optimizing. The higher level the maturity level is 
the more complex and higher requirements it has. The previous maturity level 
requirements must be maintained on the higher level. (See Figure 4, which illustrates 
the maturity level progression in the capability maturity model.) (Le&Hoang 2016, 5.) 
 
 
 
Figure 4. CMM maturity levels (Le&Hoang 2016, 5) 
 
 
3.2.2 Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model (C2M2) 
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model, in short C2M2, enables organisations 
to evaluate cyber security capabilities consistently. This is designed by self-evaluation 
methodology via a toolkit, which may be adapted later for a more rigorous 
evaluation in the future. The intended model is used for strengthening the cyber 
security capabilities of organisations, enabling organisations to consistently and 
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effectively benchmark and evaluate their cyber security capabilities. Additionally, 
sharing knowledge, best practices, and relevant references across the organisation 
improve organisations cyber security capabilities. (US Department of Energy 2014, 1.)  
There are ten domains in the Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model and each of 
them represents a different grouping of a security practice. (See Figure 5, which 
explains the structure of domains.) These ten domains are Risk Management, Asset, 
Change, and Configuration Management, Identity and Access Management, Threat 
and Vulnerability Management, Situational Awareness, Information Sharing and 
Communications, Event and Incident Response, Continuity of Operations, Supply 
Chain and External Dependencies Management, Workforce Management and 
Cybersecurity Program Management. (US Department of Energy 2014, 6-8.) 
 
 
 
Figure 5. C2M2 domain elements (US Department of Energy 2014, 7) 
 
 
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model defines four maturity indicator levels, 
known from here on as MILs (MIL0-MIL3), which are applied independently to each 
domain within the model. In order to understand how to apply the model correctly, 
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there are four aspects of the MIL. The first aspect is that the maturity indicator levels 
apply independently to each domain, in example each organisation using the model 
may be operating at varying MIL indicators or ratings for each domain. For example, 
a company could be operating at MIL1 in one domain and MIL3 in another domain. 
Secondly, the MILs are cumulative within each domain, which means that to earn a 
MIL in any given domain, one must perform all the practices in that specific level and 
the levels preceding it. Thirdly, an effective strategy for using the model to guide 
cyber security improvement is to establish a target MIL for each domain. Finally, the 
achievement an organisation wishes to have with each MIL should align with the 
business objectives. It may not be considered cost effective or align with business 
goals to achieve the highest MIL in each domain. (US Department of Energy 2014, 8-
13.) 
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model is aimed at critical infrastructure and 
was developed by the US Department of Energy. The main goal for the Cybersecurity 
Capability Maturity Model is to support organisations to assess and refine their cyber 
security. There are ten domains which contain sets of cyber security practices. To 
follow these practices, an organisation can improve their maturity in each domain 
and eventually reach a higher domain. The model has been adapted to provide cyber 
security maturity models for other critical industry subsectors such as electricity (ES-
C2M2) and oil and natural gas (ONG-C2M2). (Le&Hoang 2016, 6.) 
3.2.3  Gartner ITScore 
Gartner ITScore offers a diagnostic tool to measure maturity for various areas such as 
security and risk management. ITScore concerning security and risk management 
focuses on improvement of security and risk management programs in six domains 
of security and risk management by finding gaps and risks among those six domains. 
These six domains are business continuity management, compliance, identity and 
access management, security management and risk management. ITScore measures 
an organisation’s maturity model at five levels based on the processes the 
organisation uses. With the help of ITScore it is possible to increase the visibility of 
security programs and their risks. It also helps to find gaps between processes and 
controls related to the process. These findings and information demonstrate how 
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valuable improvements in the maturity are and help to justify costs for 
improvements. ITScore guides organisations in organisation structure changes to 
support improvements and communications to internal and external stakeholders. 
Improved maturity enhances business processes. (Proctor 2014, 1-4). 
Gartner ITScore maturity levels are Initial, Developing, Defined, Managed and 
Optimizing. At the first level of maturity, Initial, the organisation’s processes may not 
even exist and if they exist, the processes are ad hoc, separated, unorganized and 
based on IT needs. A need for improvements may be recognized; however, there are 
no responsibilities nor program in place. At the second level of maturity, Developing, 
an organisation has a small group of people who have realized the need for official 
security program, and the management may have committed to improvements. 
Usually organisations have started to react on requirements, assign responsibilities 
and design plans for implementations. At the third level of maturity, Defined, the 
whole organisation is committed to a security program and its processes and the 
performance is measured. At the fourth level of maturity, Managed, the organisation 
has implemented improvements to close the identified gaps, and decisions for new 
improvements are designed to support business needs and associate risks. At the 
fifth level of maturity, Optimizing, the security program is a part of the business 
strategy and there is an enterprise-wide risk. (See Figure 6, where Proctor visualizes 
the maturity improvement through the levels in ITScore.) (Proctor 2014, 2) 
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Figure 6. ITScore maturity levels of security and risk management (Proctor 2014, 2) 
 
 
3.3 Vulnerability management 
Vulnerability management is a layer of cyber security aiming to prevent risks from 
being realized. With vulnerability management organsations can find threats and 
vulnerabilites in their devices, operating systems, services and libraries. Vulnerability 
management is not limited to finding vulnerabilities but also to help mitigate risks 
related to vulnerabilities. This literature reviewes two vulnerability management 
guides with requirement that they were created by trusted and known author and 
have comparatible structures in the vulnreability management process. These 
selected vulnerability management guides are SANS Institute guide for implementing 
a vulnerability management process and US-CERT CRR Supplemental Resource Guide 
for vulnerability management. Vulnerability scanners and common vulnerability 
scoring system are introduced to increase basic knowledge and understanding about 
vulnerability management in practice and are not in the scope of comparison for this 
research. 
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Palmaers (2013) describes vulnerability management as a process where IT 
vulnerabilites are found and their risks are evaluated. Eventually, the risks are to be 
assessed to be mitigated or accepted. The vulnerability management is needed to 
help an organisation to protect themselves against cyber-crime and its related risks. 
The vulnerability management is an important part of an organisations security 
layers for identifying and controlling security risks. With a vulnerability management 
process the organisation receives continous information about the vulnerabilites in 
the environment and the related risks. By finding and mitigating vulnerabilities and 
their related risks, the organisation is able to protect their assests and environment 
from cyber criminals accessing its networks and assets to steal information or cause 
other disturbance. Without implementation of vulnerability management the 
organisation is very unaware of IT related security risks; hence the vulnerability 
management can be seen as another tool for better risk management. The mature 
vulnerability management process allows IT Department, management and asset 
owners to make better decisions on remediating vulnerabilities and thus, reducing 
risks. The key requirements for a working vulnerability management are assigned 
roles and responsibilities and other stakeholders kept aware of whole vulnerability 
management process. The selection of the right technology to perform vulnerability 
scanning is required as well as proper configuration of the scans. The first scans of 
vulnerability scanning may produce a huge amount of found vulnerabilities; 
therefore, limiting the remediation to high or critical severity vulnerabilities first and 
later moving to other lower severity levels makes the approach easier. (Palmaers 
2013, 2; Palmaers 2013, 20.) 
3.3.1 SANS Institute guide for implementing a vulnerability management 
process 
Tom Palmaers (2013) has written the paper Implementing a Vulnerability 
Management Process for SANS Institute. The paper describes a vulnerability 
management process objective, roles and responsibilities and provides a step-by-
step guide of phases in the vulnerability management process. 
The objective in SANS Institute guide about implementing a vulnerability 
management process is in detecting and remediating vulnerabilities in a reasonable 
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timeframe. An organisation may perform a vulnerability scan very infrequently such 
as annually or quarterly or not at all. When vulnerability scans occur infrequently 
there is a possibility that a known vulnerability exists in the IT infrastructure for a 
very long time before the next scan finds the vulnerability. During this vulnerable 
period the system or systems may have been compromised before the scan has 
found them and mitigations against the vulnerability are done. Running vulnerability 
scans more frequently such as weekly or monthly allows the organisation to discover 
and mitigate vulnerability within a reasonable and safer time to shorten the 
vulnerable period as shown below. (See Figure 7 by Palmaers). Having a vulnerability 
management process can help the organisation to reduce risks. (Palmaers 2013, 3-4.) 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Vulnerable period difference in annual and monthly scanning (adapted from 
Palmaers 2013, 3-4) 
 
 
The roles and responsibilities for vulnerability management process require that an 
organisation can identify Security Officer, Vulnerability Engineer, Asset Owner and IT 
System Engineer. The Security Officer owns and designs the vulnerability 
management process. The Vulnerability Engineer is responsible for configurations 
and schedules of vulnerability scans. The Asset Owner is the responsible for the 
assets in vulnerability management and makes decisions about vulnerability 
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mitigations or accepts the risks a vulnerability may cause to the asset. IT System 
Engineer is responsible for remediation implementation. (Palmaers 2013, 4-5.) 
The vulnerability management process of SANS Institute consists five phases, namely 
preparation, vulnerability scanning, defining remediating actions, implementing 
remediating actions and rescanning. During the preparation the Security Officer 
defines the scope for a vulnerability management process. First, in the scope 
definition it is very important to decide which systems are part of the organisation’s 
vulnerability management process. Second, it is also important to define vulnerability 
scan type and whether the scan is made from the external or internal network. Third, 
a good rule of thumb for first scans is to keep the scope small enough, because this 
can limit the amount of discovered vulnerabilities to make it more manageable. 
Fourth, for the initial vulnerability scan a risk-based approach is recommended. 
When the scope has been defined Security Officer should inform the stakeholders, 
especially IT or whichever department is monitoring security systems should be 
made aware of upcoming scans. Last step in the preparation phase is to plan the 
scans; in example how vulnerability scans work. It is important to test scanning well 
in the testing environment and if possible, find out how long individual scans take. 
Depending on vulnerability scan configuration a single scan may take few minutes or 
hours. (See Figure 8, which illustrates the preparation phase.) (Palmaers 2013, 5-8.) 
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Figure 8. Vulnerability management process preparation phase (Palmaers 2013, 6) 
 
 
During the initial scan phase of SANS Institute vulnerability management process, the 
first actual vulnerability scans are performed. It is important to monitor and report 
all anomalies carefully for future reference. Initial scan results contain information of 
which importance differs based on the recipient. For example, the Security Officer 
and management prefer information about the total amount of vulnerabilities and 
their severity. On the other hand, the Asset Owners only want information about 
vulnerabilities they are accountable for. Lastly, the IT department wants information 
about vulnerabilities with technical details and recommendations for remediation. 
(See Figure 9, which illustrates the initial scan phase.) (Palmaers 2013, 10.) 
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Figure 9. Vulnerability management process initial scan phase (Palmaers 2013, 10) 
 
 
The purpose of the remediation phase is to decide what to do with and how to 
mitigate the found vulnerabilities. The Security Officer is responsible for analysing 
the vulnerabilities and their risks. The IT department finds out solutions how the 
vulnerabilities are to be remediated with technical options such as patching, access 
restriction or configuration hardening. The Security Officer monitors that the 
vulnerability remediations have proper priority to complete remediations by the 
deadlines set by the Security Officer. There are multiple ways to monitor remediation 
such as ticketing systems, spreadsheet file or built-in tracker of a vulnerability 
scanning product. The Asset Owners make sure to schedule the timeframes when the 
vulnerability remediations take place. The timeframe depends on how fast the 
organisation can respond to the risks. If for some reason vulnerability remediation 
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does not remove or mitigate the risk to an acceptable level, the Asset owners should 
use the risk management processes for accepting the risk. (See Figure 10, which 
illustrates the remediation phase.) (Palmaers 2013, 11-12.) 
 
 
 
Figure 10. Vulnerability management process remediation phase (Palmaers 2013, 11) 
 
 
The remediations should be completed before the deadline, during their scheduled 
timeframes, and all encountered problems should be documented. The Asset owner 
should define secondary and other choices for remediation based on what the IT 
department and the Security Officer have recommended. (See Figure 11, illustrates 
the implementation of remediating actions phase.) (Palmaers 2013, 13.) 
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Figure 11. Vulnerability management process implementation of corrective action 
phase (Palmaers 2013, 13) 
 
  
The final step for SANS Institute vulnerability management process is the rescan step 
where a vulnerability scan using the same scanning configuration as before verifies 
the efficacy of remediations. With the rescan it is possible to find possible 
configuration errors in scans or remediations. The rescan is usually performed after 
the deadline for remediations has passed. The rescan should be reported to the 
involved roles and stakeholders as previously in the initial scan step. After the rescan 
and its remediations continuous vulnerability scanning needs to be agreed on with 
the Security Officer and Asset Owners. The frequency of scanning and length for the 
remediation should be learnt from the initial scan and rescan based on how well the 
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organisation can intake risks and is capable performing remediation of 
vulnerabilities. As the maturity of the organisation increases, the risk intake and 
remediation performance improve, and the frequency of scanning may be changed 
from monthly to weekly for more rapid response against vulnerabilities. Based on all 
information from successful scanning and remediation as well occurred problems or 
anomalies the vulnerability management process should be re-evaluated and 
improved. (See Figure 12, which illustrates the rescan phase of the vulnerability 
management process.) (Palmaers 2013, 14-15.) 
 
 
 
Figure 12. Vulnerability management process rescan phase (Palmaers 2013, 14) 
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3.3.2 CRR Supplemental Resource Guide for vulnerability management 
CRR Supplemental Resource Guide for vulnerability management is fourth volume of 
the US Department of Homeland Security developed guide series to help 
organisations to improve cyber security during a Cyber Resilience Review. The Cyber 
Resilience Review is an assessment which helps organisations to understand and 
measure qualitatively their IT operations ability adapt risks against their key 
operational capabilities. This guide is meant to help organisations beginning their 
vulnerability management process and is compatible with National Institute of 
Standards and Technology Cybersecurity Framework. The vulnerability management 
process is divided into four phases Define a Vulnerability Analysis and Resolution 
Strategy, Develop a Plan for Vulnerability Management, Implement the Vulnerability 
Analysis and Resolution Capability and Assess and Improve the Capability. (See Figure 
13, which describes the continuous vulnerability management process.) Also, the 
phases are divided further into steps, which will be introduced later in this chapter. 
Furthermore, this guide gives the readers better understanding about vulnerability 
management processes what the process implementation and running requires. The 
guide provides checklists to follow in various phases of the vulnerability management 
process. (Carnegie Mellon University 2016, 1-7.) 
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Figure 13. Vulnerability management top-level process (Carnegie Mellon University 
2016, 4) 
 
 
Define a Vulnerability Analysis and Resolution Strategy is a phase where reasoning, 
requirements, resources and goals for vulnerability management are defined consists 
from three steps about determining the scope for vulnerability management, 
selecting allowed methods for vulnerability assessment and resourcing activities. 
During the first step of the determining the scope an organisation must decide about 
assets and services to be included into vulnerability management and the level of 
comprehension for vulnerability assessment. This requires documentation of 
possible assets, services and their criticality and defining the cyberspace for 
operations about the vulnerability management. The second step defines allowed 
methods in vulnerability management, to successfully perform vulnerability 
assessments there needs to be support from the stakeholders and management. 
There may be some requirements for the organisation from regulations or legal 
implications which guide selection of these methods. The third step is about 
resourcing to have the required amount of staff and budget to perform vulnerability 
management as well as determining responsibilities of stakeholders to make 
authoritative decisions. (Carnegie Mellon University 2016, 7-10.) 
Develop a Plan for Vulnerability Management is a phase where a plan about 
vulnerability management implementation is created and it has eight steps which are 
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Define and document the plan, Define measures of effectiveness, Define training 
requirements, Determine tools aligned to the strategy, Identify sources of 
vulnerability information, Define the roles and responsibilities, Engage stakeholders, 
Develop a plan revision process. The first step puts the developed vulnerability 
management strategy into action and creates a plan how the strategy will be 
achieved. The plan consists creating a team for vulnerability management, 
coordinating with risk management, setting timeframes for vulnerability 
remediation, defining documentation guidelines, exception handling, scheduled 
activity and proactive activities definition. The second step is to define process 
monitoring and metering for reporting. The third step defines the requirements for 
training the staff performing vulnerability management. The fourth step guides 
through the vulnerability scanning tool selection which involves researching 
vulnerability assessment solutions, whitelisting scanning tools to use with exception 
options and reviewing selected tools regularly. The fifth step identifies assets and 
vulnerability data sources which may require creating asset inventory database and 
signing up for vendor security bulletin mailing lists. The sixth step assigns 
departments or persons into monitoring, remediation or authorization role. The staff 
with monitoring role is responsible for vulnerability analysis, documenting 
vulnerability information about found vulnerabilities and informing staff with 
remediation role. The staff with remediation role is responsible for mitigating 
vulnerability by patching, workarounds and elevating some vulnerabilities into risk 
management. The staff with authorization role is responsible for making decisions 
based on their knowledge about their managed environments. The seventh step is to 
make stakeholders aware about vulnerability management and their roles in it. These 
responsibilities could be input about department-specific requirements and following 
timeframes about remediations. The eighth step develops a process to revise the 
vulnerability management process regularly and improve if necessary. (Carnegie 
Mellon University 2016, 11-17.) 
Implement the Vulnerability Analysis and Resolution Capability has seven steps about 
performing the vulnerability management. These seven steps are Provide training, 
Conduct vulnerability assessment activities, Record discovered vulnerabilities, 
Categorize and prioritize vulnerabilities, Manage exposure to discovered 
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vulnerabilities, Determine effectiveness of vulnerability dispositions and Analyse root 
causes. The first step is to ensure train the staff about the process and the tasks, so 
they understand the workflow and their own and others’ roles in the vulnerability 
management. The second step is to perform the vulnerability scanning or 
assessments such as penetration testing. The third step is to document discovered 
vulnerabilities to predefined location or system where access is restricted only to 
those who need the information about vulnerabilities due the sensitivity of the 
information. The fourth step is to analyse the found vulnerabilities to make sure that 
they are relevant against the target and environment, are prioritized correctly and 
remediation responsibility is informed to the correct stakeholder. The fifth step 
describes a vulnerability remediation how the vulnerability is remediated, and 
remediation tracked. The remediation aims to reduce vulnerability exposure and 
bind it to the organisation risk management. The sixth step is to validate if the 
vulnerability remediation succeeded for example with a vulnerability scanner rescan. 
The seventh step analyses root causes to understand what the cause of vulnerability 
occurrence in the environment and document remediation actions was to enhance 
remediation or prevent vulnerability to occur in the future. (Carnegie Mellon 
University 2016, 19-26.) 
Assess and Improve the Capability phase aims to vulnerability management process 
regular development and consists three steps which are Determine the State of the 
program, Collect and analyse program information and Improve the capability. The 
first step is to review the current state of the program and to find the gaps against 
the vulnerability management process offering and the needs from stakeholders. The 
second step is to collect and analyse all information that the vulnerability 
management program has created and verify that it is aligned with the vulnerability 
management strategy and how effective the vulnerability management process is. 
The third step is to address previously found gaps and other problems in the 
vulnerability management process to understand what in the process needs to be 
improved. (Carnegie Mellon University 2016, 27-29)  
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3.4 Vulnerability scanners 
A vulnerability scanner is a tool to find vulnerabilities from operating system, device 
firmware, software or libraries for vulnerability management. Running the 
vulnerability scanners on a basic level does not require much technical skill from the 
operator as the most of the vulnerability scanning products can be operated from a 
graphical user interface. Palmaers (2013, 2-3) names McAfee, Qualys, Rapid7 and 
Tenable Network Solutions as vendors who offer commercial vulnerability scanning 
technology. He also mentions the existence of free open source vulnerability 
scanners. There are several other commercial vendors which are to be mentioned or 
introduced later in this chapter.  
A vulnerability scanner is a technical solution which can be operated from a public or 
private cloud software as a service (SaaS) or on-premises. To get more accurate 
results the cloud based solutions require access to on-premises vulnerability 
scanners or otherwise the scanning is limited to organisations’ public IP-addresses 
only or cause unnecessary risks by opening a firewall for scanning from outside to 
local networks. Palmaers recommends organisations to test multiple products 
carefully before deciding the solution because not all products meet the 
requirements set by the organisation. When the vulnerability scanning solution is 
selected the vulnerability scans need to be configured well to get the correct 
vulnerability information from the target and not to distrupt the target or other parts 
of the environment. (Palmaers 2013, 3-4.) 
Vulnerability scanners provide multiple options to perform scans, and the scans 
should be considered to be performed either externally or internally. An external 
scan tries to find vulnerabilities from outside the network and can be used to 
validate all security layers between the scan target and the scanner. An internal scan 
shows vulnerabilities found inside the organisation’s network. With the results it is 
possible to pinpoint vulnerabilities directly in the target system. When adding 
authentication against a scan target it is possible to gather very detailed and accurate 
results for the scan reports. Reporting is one key feature of most vulnerability 
scanning tools and a wide variety of different reports helps to assess the 
vulnerabilities and inform related stakeholders. (Palmaers 2013, 7-10.) 
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Today there are multiple vendors in the vulnerability management market while 
most the major market share is held by Qualys, Rapid7 and Tenable. Zelonis (2017, 5) 
compares multiple vulnerability management vendors with the provided features of 
the vulnerability scanner. These features are about application security scanning, 
authenticated scanning, agent based scanning, auditing configurations, container 
registries and prioritizating options. (See Figure 14, which illustrates the comparison 
of vulnerability scanner features.) (Zelonis 2017, 5-8) 
 
 
 
Figure 14. Forrester Vendor Landscape: Vulnerability Management, 2017. 
Vulnerability scanner feature comparison (Zelonis 2017, 8) 
 
 
Bhajanka & Lawson (2018) have researched various vulnerability assessment 
solutions to provide a guide for evaluating vendors and improving security programs. 
Their key findings consisted of five topics. First, all compared vendors had support for 
network-based and IT assets; however, for example the support of container 
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vulnerability scanning varies. Second, the scanning against mobile technology and 
operational technology is almost non-exist. Third, the buyers are more interested in 
prioritizing analytics and remediation. Fourth, the support to scan assets on the 
cloud platforms is becoming available by native support or via a partnership with 
known cloud service providers. Lastly, the three major vendors Qualys, Rapid7 and 
Tenable dominate the market. The recommendations for the selection of the 
vulnerability assessment solution is that it should have integration options with the 
enterprise management or other third-party system to help assessing the workflow, 
options to help assessing found vulnerabilities based on the vulnerability severity or 
other factor. They should also consider a possibility to use multiple solutions to cover 
all critical assets. The measured key features of the vulnerability assessment 
solutions are web application scanning, cloud security posture assessment, 
operational technology assessment, threat and vulnerability management, breach 
and attack simulation tools, penetration testing, vulnerability assessment methods 
and analysis of vulnerability risk impact and remediation priorization. The guide 
compares strengths and weaknesses of the vendors or lists all their solution features 
to compare; in addition, it provides a good insight to what to expect from a 
vulnerability management solution. There are forty-five representative vendors 
within the whole range of features. (Bhajanka & Lawson 2018.) 
3.5 Common Vulnerability Scoring System 
Common vulnerability scoring system, in short CVSS, has three major version of 
which versions 2 and 3 are in use.  The CVSS can be used to help prioritise 
vulnerability mitigations. (Martin 2020.) 
Most vulnerability scanning tools report the severity rating of vulnerabilities based 
on a common vulnerability scoring system. The common vulnerability scoring system 
depends on how easy the vulnerability is to exploit and how severe an impact the 
exploitation causes. The common vulnerability scoring system has a significant flaw 
when the scale of critical vulnerabilities grows to find the most important 
vulnerabilities to remediate. (Bhajanka & Lawson 2018.) 
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4 Research results 
4.1 Comparison of cyber security frameworks 
To compare cyber security frameworks this research selects the following features: 
- affiliation, 
- vulnerability management controls,  
- the levels hierarchy as in the number of controls and/or sub-controls, 
- the amount of security focus areas and 
- unique features. 
 
The NIST Cybersecurity Framework was developed for the demand of critical industry 
sector in the United States of America. In the NIST Cybersecurity Framework the first 
level of hierarchy is Function, second is Category and third Subcategory. The NIST CSF 
has five security focus areas, Functions, which are divided into Categories and Sub-
Categories. The NIST CSF is that it also has maturity model characteristics. The NIST 
CSF empathises risk management and does not contain similar guidance to 
implement controls such as ISO 27001 or CIS Controls. In NIST CSF the controls guide 
to other references such as ISO 27001, COBIT 5 and CIS Controls. (National Institute 
of Standards and Technology 2018b, 1-44.) 
The International Organisation for Standardization, ISO in short, website 
(International Organisation for Standards N.d) states that ISO is independent and not 
tied to any country. In the ISO 27001 framework the guideline for implementing 
controls is in related standard ISO 27002, but the standard ISO 27001 Annex A lists all 
the available controls and controls in the standard. The controls have three layers of 
hierarchy, but the sub-controls are not evenly divided for each main control. ISO 
27002 standard guides in-depth the control implementation with clear objectives, 
requirements and information. Technical vulnerability management is part of the ISO 
27001 Annex A controls. The latest version, 2017, of ISO 27001 standard does not 
anymore define the security areas like NIST CSF or CIS Controls, but the ISO 27001 
aims to support security thoroughly. (SFS-EN ISO/IEC 27001:2017, 15-26; SFS-EN 
ISO/IEC 27002:2017, 1-89) 
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The CIS Controls is non-profit organisation which is not affiliated to any country. In 
the CIS Controls the first level of hierarchy is Control and the second is Sub-control. 
The unique feature for CIS Controls is the Implementation Groups. The calculation of 
total number of Sub-controls would vary depending on the Implementation Group 
level. The controls have two layers of hierarchy, but the sub-controls are not evenly 
divided for each main control. The CIS Controls explain the reason and objective for 
the controls clearly and guide implementation of controls to basic technical level. 
Vulnerability management is a main control and a part of the Basic category in The 
CIS Controls. (The Center for Internet Security 2019, 2-70) 
The comparable features of each cyber security framework are compared in the 
table below. (See Table 1.) 
 
 
Table 1. The comparison of cyber security frameworks 
Cyber Security 
Framework 
NIST CSF ISO 27001 CIS Controls 
Number of 
security focus 
areas/functions 
5 Not applicable 3 
Hierarchy of 
controls 
3 3 2 
Number of 
main controls 
23 14 20 
Total number 
of sub-controls 
107 114 171 
Vulnerability 
management 
Yes Yes Yes 
Development 
affiliated by a 
country 
Yes No No 
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4.2 Comparison of maturity models 
To compare cyber security frameworks this research selects the following features: 
- the number of maturity levels and 
- the number of security domains. 
 
Due to the reason that the Capability Maturity Model had been developed for 
software development, there is not a direct relation to cyber security in the 
Capability Maturity Model, but it has the easily cyber security -adaptable five 
maturity levels. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model has maturity levels 
three MIL0-3 and ten security domains. The Gartner ITScore has five maturity levels 
which concentrate on six different security domains. The Gartner ITScore and 
Capability Maturity Model share same maturity levels, which are less complex than 
The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model maturity levels. On the other hand, The 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model has more in-depth approach how to use the 
model, the other compared maturity models also have basic how to use the model 
instructions. A threat and vulnerability management is one of the domains in 
Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model. The comparison of maturity models is 
presented in the tableTable 2 below. (See Table 2.)Table 1 
 
 
Table 2. The comparison of maturity models 
Maturity Model Capability 
Maturity Model 
Cybersecurity 
Capability 
Maturity Model 
Gartner ITScore 
Number of 
maturity levels 
4 5 5 
Number of 
security domains 
Not applicable 10  6 
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4.3 Comparison of vulnerablity management processes 
To compare cyber security frameworks this research selects the following features: 
- the level of hierarchy, 
- the number of tasks in the processes, 
- the number of phases of the process and 
- the number of roles or stakeholders in the processes. 
 
The CRR Supplemental Resource Guide and SANS Institute guide for implementing a 
Vulnerability Management Process are presented very differently which adds some 
incompatibilities to comparison. The SANS Institute guide for implementing a 
Vulnerability Management Process the number of tasks has loops, which do not give 
exact number of steps in the process, therefore; the number of steps is calculated 
with no loops and one loop. In the CRR Supplemental Resource Guide for 
vulnerability management the involved roles are not clearly defined, but these roles 
and stakeholders are to be identified in the process. The SANS guide has two 
hierarchy layers; phase and process steps while The CRR guide has phases, steps and 
sub-steps. The SANS guide does not have clear improvement guidance about the 
vulnerability management program itself while The CRR guide does. The comparison 
of vulnerability management implementation processes is presented at the 
tableTable 3 below, the table continues in next page. (See Table 3.) 
 
 
Table 3. The comparison of vulnerability management implementation processes 
Vulnerability 
management 
implementation process 
SANS Institute guide for 
implementing a 
Vulnerability 
Management Process 
CRR Supplemental 
Resource Guide for 
vulnerability 
management 
Number of phases 5 5 
Number of steps min 16, max 18 21 
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Number of sub-steps Not applicable 61 
Number of involved roles  4 Not defined 
Depth of process 
(hierarchy layers) 
2 3 
 
 
5 Conclusions 
Developing and maintaining a cyber security program in an organisation requires 
focus on multiple areas. The usual method to build cyber security is to use the onion 
model, where security is built with layers. Selecting the framework is good base to 
start building the cyber security and maturity model can be used to evaluate its 
quality. Vulnerability management is part of all three selected frameworks, but the 
importance and priority vary. 
This research has followed the qualitative and comparative research methods to 
answer research questions. Organisations need to build solid basis for cyber security 
with a framework, use maturity models to evaluate and develop their cyber security 
program. Part of this cyber security program becomes vulnerability management. For 
the two first research questions “How to build a solid basis to begin vulnerability 
management?” and “When is the organisation mature enough for technical 
vulnerability management?” the straight answers are left open for organisations to 
select by themselves with information, knowledge and understanding provided by 
this research. For the third research question “Can there be an easily adaptable 
implementation process for technical vulnerability management?” this research 
concludes that both researched and compared guides, SANS Institute guide for 
implementing a Vulnerability Management Process and CRR Supplemental Resource 
Guide for vulnerability management, are easily adaptable vulnerability management 
implementation processes in theory. 
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5.1 Cyber Security Frameworks 
The three compared cyber security frameworks have their own pros and cons. The 
complexity and resources required for implementation of the NIST Cybersecurity 
Framework or the ISO 27001. A small enterprise may find it difficult to implement 
the NIST CSF or the ISO 27001 by themselves. The NIST CSF referencing to other 
publications may be overwhelming with information. The NIST CSF for being 
developed for the United States of America critical sectors, the framework is often 
enforced in the country and usage in other regions may require some adaption. To 
have built-in maturity model is a good feature in the NIST CSF, which helps 
organisations to evaluate their cyber security programs maturity and evolve them. 
The ISO 27001 implementation for organisation is a lengthy process which may also 
be heavy as controls give very in-depth explanation what they require. The other 
benefit of ISO 27001, than a continuous security program, is that its certification is 
highly valued and offers many good opportunities when obtained. The CIS Controls 
has the most sub-controls to be implemented of the three compared cyber security 
frameworks, but the Implementation Groups help implementation of the framework 
for different size enterprises. Out of the three compared security frameworks the CIS 
Controls seems the most approachable. 
5.2 Cyber Security Maturity Models 
A cyber security maturity model helps organisations to evaluate and develop their 
cyber security program. The Capability Maturity Model itself is not a maturity model 
for cyber security, but other maturity models which have derived from it may be 
found useful. Yet, the Capability Maturity Model consists the basics of a maturity 
model and understanding it is useful. The Cybersecurity Capability Maturity Model 
provides a heavy, but well-organised tool for assessing the maturity of cyber security 
program. Threat and vulnerability management being part of the C2M2 makes it very 
viable maturity model for this research. Several of the C2M2 domains measure 
controls found in the cyber security frameworks, such as asset, change, and 
configuration management or identity and access management. This makes the 
C2M2 very compatible with cyber security frameworks. The C2M2 is aimed at critical 
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infrastructure which sets requirements which some smaller enterprises may not be 
able to follow easily; therefore, the C2M2 may be more suitable for large enterprises 
or some medium size enterprises. The Gartner ITScore offers very simple compact 
maturity model which can be easily followed even with smaller enterprises. On the 
other hand, the data available about the Gartner ITScore was very limited and it gives 
rough guidelines for its six security domains to evaluate and improve. The maturity 
model levels, and the level definitions are clear and easily followed. 
5.3 Vulnerability Management Implementation Processes 
The two compared vulnerability management implementation processes are both 
good and offer very useful tool for implementing the vulnerability management. 
SANS Institute guide for implementing a Vulnerability Management Process has clear 
explanations with visualised step-by-step processes while CRR Supplemental 
Resource Guide for vulnerability management guides reader through the guide with 
steps and sub-steps. The SANS guide approach is very easy to follow and has useful 
hands on information to process with the guide. The CRR guide has built-in checklists 
for the beginning and the end of each phase which help to make sure that 
requirements are met. The SANS guide suits better for small and medium 
enterprises, while The CRR guide suits better for medium and large enterprises.  
6 Discussion 
The research was divided to three comparisons to help organisations understand 
more how vulnerability management can be implemented part of their cyber security 
program. The comparison of cyber security frameworks, cyber security maturity 
models and vulnerability management implementation processes limited the 
presented and compared subjects to two or three per framework, maturity model 
and process, but this allowed the research to provide wider understanding about 
vulnerability management place in cyber security programs. Yet, the third subject for 
vulnerability management implementation process would have been useful than 
comparing only two subjects. The problem with only two processes was very 
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different implementation guides and comparable data was presented totally 
different ways. 
The use of comparative research method did not provide a new implementation 
process, but it was still able to prove answer to the third research question.  
The subject selection was initially planned to be non-affiliated and global, but still 
nationally developed subjects were part of the research. With nationally developed 
subjects, might be interesting to have Finnish KATAKRI or VAHTI-instructions part of 
the framework comparison. Cyber security programs and vulnerability management 
may be too heavy perform by small or medium size enterprises; therefore, new 
research opportunities open about vulnerability management and other cyber 
security program implementation with collaboration of information technology 
service provider. 
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